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Abstract—Wearable devices enable users to collect health data
and share them with healthcare providers for improved health
service. Since health data contain privacy-sensitive information,
unprotected data release system may result in privacy leakage
problem. Most of the existing work use differential privacy for
private data release. However, they have limitations in healthcare
scenarios because they do not consider the unique features of
health data being collected from wearables, such as continuous
real-time collection and pattern preservation. In this paper, we
propose Re-DPoctor, a real-time health data releasing scheme
with w-day differential privacy where the privacy of health
data collected from any consecutive w days is preserved. We
improve utility by using a specially-designed partition algorithm to
protect the health data patterns. Meanwhile, we improve privacy
preservation by applying newly proposed adaptive sampling tech-
nique and budget allocation method. We prove that Re-DPoctor
satisfies w-day differential privacy. Experiments on real health
data demonstrate that our method achieves better utility with
strong privacy guarantee than existing state-of-the-art methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of wearable devices, such as Fitbit and
Apple Watch, enables the continuous collection of personal
health data including heart rate, walking steps, and sleep
condition. The personal health data can be a good indication
for users to keep track of their tness and can be further shared
with healthcare providers for various purposes. For example,
users could share data with an insurance company for a lower
premium, and tness advisor for a better health plan. In these
cases, users prefer to share minimum amount of information to
healthcare providers. From [1], the disclosure of unnecessary
health data may result in severe privacy violations. We consider
a scenario where a healthcare provider requires a user to
provide the health data collected during the next two weeks.
The user needs to consider two factors, i) utility, the disclosed
data must be useful; ii) privacy, the disclosure must consume
less than a privacy budget.
Health data collected from wearable devices has following
unique properties. First, it contains signicant health patterns,
which may imply health conditions. The patterns need to be
reserved in the privacy protection algorithm. Second, health
data is generated continuously. The usefulness of data varies
from day to day. Generally, when the data is not useful, the
data does not need to be disclosed. On the other hand, if the
data is useful, the data need to be disclosed with a privacy
constraint. Given a privacy budget for two weeks, for example,
the budget should be adaptively arranged on a daily basis. As
such, the utility of the disclosed data can be maximized while
the privacy goal is achieved.
Differential Privacy [2], proposed by DWork, is a popular
paradigm to provide privacy in the data release. A common way
to achieve differential privacy is to perturb data with noise [3],
[4]. Most existing literatures has mainly focused on the one-
time release of static data [5]–[9]. However, in health releasing
scenario, data has to be collected and released continuounsly
due to the power limit of wearable devices. Several studies
[10]–[13] have been focused on real-time data releasing with
differential privacy guarantee. In [14], Wang et al. proposed
a scheme achieving w-event privacy. However, their schemes
have limitations. Its decision on data usefulness only depends
on the data dynamics and ignore the health condition of the
user. Thus it does not fit in our case.
In this paper, we propose Re-DPoctor for Real-time e-doctor
health data releasing with differential privacy to solve our
problem. The contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows.
• We proposed a practical releasing scheme Re-DPoctor
which guaranteesw-day privacy, a new privacy level denition in
the continuous data stream. Its key modules include adaptive
sampling, adaptive budget allocation, DP-Partition, perturba-
tion, feature extraction and ltering.
• The design of Re-DPoctor achieves better accuracy and
privacy level. It uses partition algorithm to protect health pattern
to improve the accuracy while using adaptive sampling and
budget allocation algorithm which takes health condition and
data dynamic into account to improve privacy level.
•We prove that our scheme satises w-day privacy and do ex-
periments on real collected wearable device data. Compared to
others, we have better results on utility and privacy guarantee.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy
A mechanism which satisfies Differential Privacy should
guarantee that the query result remains approximately the same
if a single record is added or deleted.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [2]): A randomized mech-
anismM gives ǫ-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one, and all O ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(D1) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr[M(D2) ∈ O] (1)
ǫ is the privacy budget. A smaller ǫ means more noise and
stronger privacy level.
Laplace mechanism is the most common one to guarantee
ǫ-differential privacy.
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism [5]): For any function f :
D → Rd, the Laplace Mechanism f for any dataset D ∈ D
M(D) = f(D) + Lap(
∆(f)
ǫ
) (2)
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Here, ∆(f) is sensitivity defined
in [5] and ǫ represents the privacy level.
B. w-day Privacy
w-day ǫ-differential privacy is a concept improved from
[10], which is a new way to define privacy level over infinite
stream information. It guarantees that for any successive events
happened in a window of w days; the privacy leakage level is
no more than ǫ.
We model the data stream as an infinite stream tuple S =
(D1, D2, ...), where S[i] is the i
th element of S, i.e. Di. The
stream prefix of S at t represents as St = (D1, D2, ..., Dt).
Definition 2 (w-neighboring): Let w to be a positive integer.
Two stream prefixs St,S
′
t are w-neighboring, if
1) for each pair St[i] 6= S′t[i] with i ∈ [t], it holds that
St[i],S
′
t[i] are neighboring (e.g.St[i],S
′
t[i] have at most one
row different);
2) for each St[i1],St[i2],S
′
t[i1],S
′
t[i2] with i1 < i2,St[i1] 6=
S′t[i1]and St[i2] 6= S
′
t[i2], it holds that i2 − i1 + 1 ≤ w.
Definition 3 (w-day Privacy): Let M be a mechanism
that takes as input a stream prefix of arbitrary size. Let
O = Range(M) be the set of all possible outputs ofM. Then
we call that M satisfies w-day ǫ-differential privacy if for all
sets O ⊆ O, all w-neighboring stream prefixes St[i],S′t[i] , and
all t, it holds that
Pr[M(St) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr[M(S
′
t) ∈ O] (3)
Theorem 2 [10]: LetM be a mechanism that takes as input
stream prefix St, where St[i] =Di ∈ D, and outputs a transcript
o = (o1, ..., ot) ∈ O. Suppose that we can decompose M into
t mechanisms M1, . . . , Mt, such that Mi(Di) = oi, Let
Mi be ǫi-differential private for some ǫi. Then,M will satisfy
w-differential privacy if
∀i ∈ [t],
i∑
k=i−w+1
ǫk ≤ ǫ (4)
It means we could view ǫ as the whole privacy budget in a
w-day sliding window and any budget falls out of the window
could be recycled and reused.
III. RE-DPOCTOR: REAL-TIME HEALTH DATA RELEASING
WITH W-DAY PRIVACY
Consider the scenario where the user has a wearable device
to monitor his health data. Also, there exists an E-doctor that
the wearable tracking device would release heart rate data to
the server in hospital from time to time. When the user goes
to the hospital, the doctor can pull out the data and do the
analysis. However, the dilemma is, how could we design the
health histogram releasing mechanism to only release useful
data for diagnosing needs while maintaining the privacy? One
common way is to perturb the data with noise. But applying
unifying noise to the original data will cause the decreasing
precision of histogram. Besides, there are many patterns in
the original histogram that could be buried in too much noise.
The solution is to design a mechanism that could preserve the
desired patterns and protect the privacy.
In this section, we present a real-time health data releasing
with w-day differential privacy. Figure 1 shows an overview of
the proposed scheme, which contains six modules: Partitioning,
Perturbation, Feature Extraction, Adaptive Sampling, Adaptive
Budget allocation, Filtering.
Fig. 1. Overview of Real-time e-doctor histogram releasing with differential
privacy
Firstly, adaptive sampling mechanism adjusts the sampling
rate based on data dynamics and health condition, which
perturbs histograms at sampling day and approximate the non-
sampled day with perturbed histograms at last sampling day.
Then budget allocation mechanism dynamically allocates the
privacy budget ǫ at sampling days. The first two steps make
sure the non-sampled points can be approximated without any
budget allocation. Thus, given a fixed ǫ more precious privacy
budget can be allocated to the histogram needed to be released
and reduce the errors caused by Laplace noise and improve
overall accuracy. Then, the DP-Partitioning mechanism could
preserve desired patterns for health diagnose. Then Laplace
mechanism is used to perturb the partitioned histogram. At
last,filtering mechanism helps to improve the accuracy of the
released data.
The followings are the main components of the proposed
scheme in details.
A. Adaptive Sampling
When a user publishes all the histograms at every day,
it will introduce large noise and affect the utility of the
released histograms. Here comes the seemingly non-negotiable
tradeoff between the accuracy and privacy of the histogram
releasing. Thus, sampling will be a great method to deal with
such a dilemma that we sample the important histogram at
certain selected days and leave the non-sampled ones to be
approximated. Since the non-sampled histograms do not cost
any privacy budget, the selected one can be allocated more
budget and improve their accuracy.
Several earlier researchers have proposed methods to adjust
sampling rate but didn’t fit in our scenario of health data.
DSAT [12] failed to apply in health data because it uses a
fixed sampling rate which is unrealistic in real-time health
monitoring. Another approach by Wang [14] fails to fit in health
monitoring because it ignores the health condition of the user
as a dynamic factor which could affect the sampling rate.
In this paper, we proposed a new adaptive sampling mech-
anism, which takes the current health condition, histogram
dynamics, and remaining budget into consideration. Suppose
the current sample day is ti and the last sample day is ti−1. The
heart rate records are dti , dti−1 respectively. We use Pearson
correlation coefficient as the feedback error:
Eti = ρdti ,dti−1 =
Cov(dti , dti−1)
σdtiσdti−1
(5)
Here we choose to use the released histogram instead of
the raw histogram to protect the privacy. It may introduce a
little error which is relatively small compared to the privacy it
provides.
The PID error is defined as:
uti = θP × eti + θI ×
∑ti
o=ti−w+1
eo
w
+ θD ×
eti
ti − ti−1
(6)
where the θP ,θI ,θD are the proportional gain, the integral gain,
and the derivative gain.
Proportional term: The first term is proportional to the
current error eti =
|Eti−δ|
δ where Eti is the feedback error, and
the parameter δ is the set point. We set δ as 5% experiments
as the maximum tolerance of the feedback error.
Integral term: The second term stands for the accumulation
of past error θI ×
∑ti
o=ti−m+1
eo
w where θI is the integral gain
and the m is how many samples are taken into account.
Derivative term: The third term
eti
ti−ti−1
just determines the
slope of error over time and predicts the future error.
Intuitively, the sampling interval should be small if user’s
health condition changes rapidly. However, if the remaining
budget is small, sampling at the next day will introduce a
high perturbation error. A more reasonable choice is to use
a relatively large sampling interval so that previously allocated
budget could be recycled and to approximate the histogram
with the previous publication.
Besides histogram dynamics and remaining privacy budget,
another factor we need to consider is the health condition of
the user. Imagine two users have same histogram dynamics
and remaining privacy budget but one in sick condition and
another one in good health. Applying same sampling method
are not applicable because the sick user apparently needs more
concerns and needs to release histograms more frequently than
the healthy one. One rule for health data releasing is that we
should never sacrifice the user’s health for privacy. We use cti
to denote user’s health condition which can get from the feature
extraction module.
Combined all the three factors, the next sampling rate is
defined as below:
Iti = max{1, Iti−1 +η(1−(
uti
λ
)2), Iti−1+η(1−(
ci
λ
)2)} (7)
where Iti and Iti−1 is the next and last sampling interval
respectively. And λr = 1/ǫr is the scale of Laplace noise
where ǫr is the remaining budget. η is the scale factor to adjust
the sampling interval. Consequently, the sampling interval will
increase when the u < λ or c < λ and decrease otherwise.
B. Adaptive Budget Allocation
The definition of the w-day privacy requires the total budgets
within the sliding window of w equals a certain value ǫ.
For the ith sampling day , firstly, we have to calculate the
remaining budget in the window ǫr = ǫ−
∑ti−1
j=ti−w+1
ǫj . Note
that if ǫjis not a sampling day, then it equals zero. Then,
inspired by RescueDP, we allocate the remaining budget based
on the sampling interval. When the sampling interval is small,
it can be inferred that the histogram changes rapidly or the user
is the sick condition. Moreover, we can infer there will be a
large number of sampling points in the w time windows. Then,
we allocate a small portion of the remaining privacy budget to
the coming sampling point so that there will be more privacy
left for future use. Fortunately, natural logarithm could quantify
such a relationship. Define the portion as:
p = min(ln(φ · I + 1), pmax) (8)
where the φ is the scale factor to adjust the budget portion
and the pmax limits the maximum value of a portion. So the
allocated budget portion will increase as the sampling interval
increase. Meanwhile, it slows down when the interval is large
enough. Finally, we calculate the budget simply by applying the
portion to the remaining budget as ǫi = min(p·ǫr, ǫmax),where
the ǫmax limits the maximum value of budget because excessive
privacy budget could achieve little improvement to the utility
of histogram.
C. Partitioning
Health data histogram is different from other ordinary his-
tograms. Without suitable partition, health data histogram could
easily lose their important features or patterns, which are crucial
for diagnoses, during aggregation and randomization. The main
goal is to design an algorithm to preserve the desired pattern of
heart rate in releasing the histogram. We use partition algorithm
to protect certain patterns. In our case, we mainly focus on two
patterns: small but rapid change and slow but large change.
Before partition, the database records will be aggregated
into data bins on a 10 minutes basis. Then the bins will be
partitioned into the set of buckets based on the value, the
structure and the threshold of the original bins database. Since
the buckets structure may reveal information, and one could
infer private information in the database due to the small
changes in the database. To prevent such privacy leakage, we
decide to use part of the privacy allocated for the ith sampling
point to protect the threshold of the partition. Here we use a
constant q as the scale to denote the portion of privacy budget
for partition.
The algorithm of partitioning with differential privacy is in
Algorithm 2. Before the start of the algorithm, several variables
need to be declared: Variables di, bj are the value of ith bin of
histogram database D and the jth bucket, respectively. Integers
i, j, size are the indexes of the current bin and the current
bucket and the size of the current bucket,respectively. last holds
the value of last bin. The Min,Max indicates the maximum
and minimum value of current bucket. And three thresholds
which are learned from public information and are set based
on user setup:
• TD: the maximum difference between the maximum and
minimum value in one bucket, accords to slow but large
change
• TR: the maximum instant change of heart rate between
adjacent bins. Normally, this threshold is smaller than
TD because the change between two adjacent bins may
actually be smaller than TD, but since it happened in a
very small period of time, it must be preserved. It accords
to rapid change.
• TS : the maximum size of each bucket in case of the
oversize of a bucket.
Due to the privacy requirement of the partition algorithm, we
add Laplace noises Z,Z ′ to TD and TR threshold parameters
and get TˆD and TˆR.
The partition process could be easily understood. In the
beginning, it put the first bin into the first bucket and move
to next bin. Then the algorithm checks all the threshold
requirement, if they are all met then the current bin will be put
into the same bucket. Otherwise, a new bucket will be created.
The first checked threshold is TR due to its smaller value. If
the threshold is breached, two single bin buckets need to be
created, each containing the adjacent sudden change bins so
that their values won’t be averaged later. Based on the size of
the current bucket, three cases are considered. Moreover, the
second and third threshold will be tested and either the new
bucket will be created, or the current bucket will be enlarged.
D. Perturbation
The results from the previous step buckets then will be
randomized by simply adding noise which following Laplace
distribution at each sampling point.
After suitable partition, we firstly have to average the bins
in the same bucket first. Then, we just add Laplace noise to
the average value of bins of every bucket. Suppose the min-
imum possible change in the query result from neighborhood
databases is α and the remaining portion for randomization is
(1− q) · ǫi. So Laplace noise for ith sampling day will be
v′j = vj + Lap(
α
(1− q) · ǫi
) (9)
where v is the average value of bucket j.
E. Filtering
In order to eliminate the error introduced by using released
data in adaptive sampling and budget allocation mechanism, we
Algorithm 1 Differential-private partition Algorithm
Input: Dti , TD, TR, TL, q · ǫi;
Output: histogram buckets B;
1: Initialization: Set size = 0; i = 1; j = 1;B = ∅;
2: TˆD = TD + Z , TˆR = TR + Z
′ ⊲ Z, Z ′:Lap((q · ǫi))
3: bj ← di; Min = Max = current = di; size++; i++;
4: while i ≤ length(D) do
5: if current 6= Null and |current− di|> TˆR then
6: if bj−1.length > 1 then
7: ⊲ Last bucket is not a single bin bucket
8: last = B.pop(); bj = last.pop();
9: B ← last;B ← bj;j ++; bj ← di;B ← bj ;
10: j ++;current = x;i ++;size = 0;
11: else ⊲ Last bucket is a single bin bucket
12: bj ← x;B ← bj ;
13: j ++,current = di;i ++;size = 0;
14: end if
15: else if size == 1 then
16: B ← bj ;j ++;bj ← di;j ++;
17: current = di;size = 0;i++;
18: else if size ≥ 1 then
19: last = bj .pop();B ← bj ;j ++; bj ← last;
20: B ← bj ;j ++; bj ← di;B ← bj ;j ++;
21: current = x;i ++;size = 0;
22: end if
23: Max = max(Max, di);Min = min(Min, di);
24: if |Max−Min| ≤ TˆD and size ≤ TS then
25: bj ← di; current = di; size+ +; j ++;
26: else
27: B ← bj ; current = di; size = 0; j ++;
28: end if
29: end while
30: return B
use Particle filter improve the accuracy of releasing histogram
by estimating the perturbed histogram. We chose Particle filter
instead of Kalman filter because in [11], it is proved that
although the Particle filter cost much more time and has greater
complexity, it achieves more accuracy. Moreover, when comes
to protect the health data, accuracy weighs better importance
than algorithm complexity. In the final releasing histogram pi at
the i, it releases posterior estimates of particle filter at sampling
points and prior estimates at non-sampling points. Due to the
space limit, we omit the details of filtering. Please refer to [11]
for details.
F. Feature Extraction
Then we need to level the health condition by extracting
features from the released histograms. Here we adopt the
simplest model just for explanation and focus on four features
of four typical rhythms for potential heart disease: hr: the
number of time when the user’s heart rate has a rapid increase
or decrease in a short period, which could be explained as the
signal of heart-attack; hg: the number of time when the user’s
heart rate has a great increase or decrease in a long time, which
could be explained as the signal of palpitation; hh: the time
when the user’s heart rate keeps above maximum threshold,
which could be explained as the signal of angina; hl: the time
when the user’s heart rate keeps below minimum threshold,
which could be explained as the signal of sinus bradycardia
Then we define the health condition ci at i as:
ci = max{
1
4
(
hr
nr
+
hg
ng
+
hh
nh
+
hl
nl
), 1} (10)
where nr, ng, nh, nl are the standard tolerant values from
medical references. So the calculated health condition ci could
be used in the adaptive sampling mechanisms. Since the feature
extraction is based on the released histogram, so it does not cost
any privacy budget, either.
G. Privacy Analysis
Theorem 3: Partitioning process satisfies q · ǫi-differential
privacy at the i.
Proof: Let the d0, d1 be the neighboring databases and the
M(d0),M(d1) be the output. To prove partition process is
q ·ǫi-differential private, we need to prove: Pr(M(d0) = B) ≤
eq·ǫi × Pr(M(d1) = B). Suppose the maximum difference in
the value of bins in two neigboring databases is bounded by α.
For each bucket, we have to meet the bound Maxj −Minj <
TˆD and |current − xi|< TˆR. And according to the sequential
composition property of DP, taking q · ǫi = ǫ1 + ǫ2. So the
inequality can be transformed into:
Pr(M(d0) = B)
Pr(M(d1) = B)
≤ eq·ǫi
⇔ X = (
∏
bi∈d0
Pr(Maxj0 −Minj0 < TˆD)
∏
bi∈d0
Pr(Maxj0 −Minj0 < TˆD)
≤ eǫ1)
× (
∏
bi∈d0
Pr(|current − xj0|< TˆR)
∏
bi∈d0
Pr(|current − xj1|< TˆR)
≤ eǫ2)
We try to solve the inequalities separately in order to find
the required Laplace distribution. Suppose the changed record
between the neighbouring databases falls into the bucket bj .
For the first inequality, the changed record may effectMaxj0
and Minj0 or an ordinary bin’s count of bj . If the changed
value only affects ordinary bins. Clearly, X1 = 1 < eǫ1 . If
the changed value effects either Maxj0 or Maxj1, we need to
find the suitable Laplace scale(b = s/ǫ1) in order to have this
change tolerated. Suppose the Maxj0 and Minj1 are changed
by α. Take Z ∼ Lap(s/ǫ1), t = Maxj0 −Minj1 and u =
t− TD. Here we only consider the change of Maxj0.
When Maxj0 = Maxj0 + α:
X1 =
t+ α < TˆD
t < TˆD
=
Z > u+ α
Z > u
< 1 ≤ eǫ1
When Maxj0 = Maxj0 − α:
X1 =
t− α < TˆD
t < TˆD
=
Z > u− α
Z > u
=
∫ +∞
u−α
fz(z)dz
∫ +∞
u
fz(z)dz
≤ eǫ1
And we discuss the above inequation in three cases:
• u ≥ α: X1 = eαǫ1/s ⇒ αǫ1/s ≤ ǫ1 ⇒ s ≥ α
• 0 < u < α:
X1 =
1/2 +
∫ 0
u−α fz(z)dz∫ +∞
u fz(z)dz
=
2− e
u−α
b
e
−u
b
≤ eǫ1
Let v = eu/b,then X1 = 2v − e
−α
b v2 ≤ eǫ1 ⇒ s ≥ α
• u ≤ 0:
X1 =
1/2 +
∫ 0
u−α fz(z)dz
1/2 +
∫ 0
u
fz(z)dz
=
2− e
u−α
b
2− e
u
b
≤ eǫ1
⇔ eǫ1(euǫ1)1/s − [e(u−α)ǫ1 ]1/s ≤ 2eǫ1 − 2
Taking s = α, the inequality above holds. Thus, the first
inequality holds so b = αǫ1 is sufficient for differential privacy.
Due to the space limit, we omit the details of second
inequality. Because it is similar to the first part. So we can
get the proof of privacy for b = αǫ2 directly.
Theorem 4: The Re-DPoctor satisfies w-day ǫ-differential
privacy.
Proof: According to Axiom 2.1.1 in [15], post-processing
perturbed data maintain privacy as long as it does not use the
sensitive information. Since among all the components, only
the partition and perturbation process access to the raw data,
while the others operate on the perturbed data. Thus, if we
can prove that these two mechanisms together satifsfies w-
day ǫ-differential privacy, the Re-DPoctor will satisfy w-day
ǫ-differential privacy.
According to Theorem 4, as previous proved, at i, the
partition process statisfies q · ǫi-differential privacy. According
to Theorem 1, at i, the perturbation process satisfies (1−q) ·ǫi-
differential privacy for applying Laplace noise. So for any i,
the Re-DPoctor provides ǫi-differential privacy. Since the adap-
tive budget allocation mechanism guarantees for any sliding
window w that
∑i
k=i−w+1 ǫk ≤ ǫ. Consequently, Re-DPoctor
satisfies w-day privacy.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Re-DPoctor
on real health data. We have conducted real experiments
on captured heart rates from wearable devices attached to a
hospital patient during three months.
In the experiments, we set θP = 0.8, θI = 0.2, θD = 0 and
m = 3 for the PID controller. In Adaptive budget allocation, we
set φ = 0.2. In Partitioning, we use TD = 30, TR = 15, TL = 4
as the thresholds. Because heart rate usually changes between
50 and 200 and we track our w-day window as 14 days. So
we define our sensitivity α = 15014 . Without explanation, we set
w = 14 and ǫ = 3 for all databases.
We use Mean Absolute Error(MAE) and Mean Relative
Error( MRE) as the utility metrics to evaluate the performance
of our scheme. The bound γ is set to 0.05% of
∑n
i=1 xi in
order to mitigate the effect of extra small bins which could
result from the take-off of the watch.
Fig. 2. Utility comparision when ǫ changes (w=14)
Fig. 3. Utility comparision when w changes (ǫ=1)
Utility vs Privacy: Figure 2 investigates how MAE and
MRE change with various ǫ values and makes the comparison
between Re-DPoctor and BA and BD [10]. We can see that
with the increasing of ǫ, both MAE and MRE of the dataset
decrease. It is natural because a larger ǫ means smaller boise.
Also, We can see that MAE and MRE both are smaller than
BD and BA over the whole time period.
The better utility performance of Re-DPoctor contributes
to three reasons. First, the Re-DPoctor adaptively adjust the
sampling and allocate the privacy budget more appropriately.
Within the fixed total budget, it samples the days with useful
data and allocates more budget to them. Second. the Re-
DPoctor has a more available budget for perturbation than other
methods at any w day window. In BD and BA, part of the
budget is used for calculating the similarity. Third, the proper
partition mechanism recognizes the patterns and improves the
accuracy of released data.
Utility vs w: In figure 3, we compare Re-DPoctor with BA
and BD while varying w values. We can see that the MAE and
MRE of BD and BA increase greatly when w increases. When
w increases, in order to ensure the total budget less than ǫ, BA
may skip the day which may contain useful data and results
larger errors. In contrast, Re-DPoctor is more stable because it
takes the window size and remaining budget into consideration
and adaptively change the budget of next sampling point.
Effect of Partitioning: We also conduct two experiments of
Re-DPoctor on the same dataset with and without partition to
evaluate the effects of our partition mechanism. We can see
from the results of Table 1 that the partition reduces MAE and
MRE significatly. Therefore, we can conclude that partition can
not only preserve the patterns but also improves the utility of
released data.
TABLE I
UTILITY WITH OR WITHOUT PARTITION
With Partition Without Partition
MAE 156 355
MRE 0.23 0.36
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed Re-DPoctor, a real-time health
data releasing scheme with w-day differential privacy achieving
both utility and privacy guarantee. We designed a framework
for Re-DPoctor consisting of mechanisms of adaptive sampling,
adaptive budget distribution, partition, perturbation,ltering, and
feature extraction. The privacy analysis proves that Re-DPoctor
satises w-day differential privacy. Experiments on real health
data show that Re-DPoctor outperforms other methods and
achieves both utility and privacy required.
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